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Abstract 
Political scientists have developed two principal models for 
analyzing and predicting the decision making of justices. First, the 
attitudinal model predicts that decisions are made based on the 
justices’ personal policy preferences. This model can be utilized to 
correctly predict the votes of each justice in United States v. Windsor. 
The second model, the strategic model—which is well demonstrated 
by the votes in Craig v. Boren—borrows its foundation from the 
attitudinal model, but it also accounts for the fact that justices 
sometimes must consider the votes of other members of the Court if 
they want to reach consensus and avoid their most undesirable policy 
preferences. This model provides an explanation for the seemingly 
unpredictable results found in Hollingsworth v. Perry, by examining 
the alleged motivations of the five justices whose opinions broke from 
how they decided Windsor. Justices Ginsburg, Kagan, and Breyer 
switched votes between Windsor and Hollingsworth, to find no 
standing in Perry based on, among other things, their fear that a 
judgment on the merits would have a backlash similar to that of Roe 
v. Wade. Justices Alito and Thomas, the most conservative justices, 
decided that there was standing because the most idealistic tend to 
resist compromise. With these taken into account, the strategic model 
is able to predict the Perry outcome. 
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Introduction 
Both legal and political science scholars have long contemplated 
the question, why do Supreme Court justices vote the way they do? 
The traditional “legal model” of decision making is premised on “the 
belief that, in one form or another, the decisions of the Court are 
substantially influenced by the facts of the case in light of the plain 
meaning of statutes and the Constitution, the intent of the Framers, 
and/or precedent.”1 But, as esteemed jurist Richard Posner once 
observed, “[t]here is a tremendous amount of sheer hypocrisy in 
judicial opinion-writing. . . . Judges have a terrible anxiety about 
being thought to base their opinions on guesses or their personal 
views. To allay that anxiety, they rely on the apparatus of precedent 
and history, much of it extremely phony.”2  
 
1. Jeffrey A. Segal & Harold J. Spaeth, The Supreme Court and 
the Attitudinal Model Revisited 48 (2002). In contrast to the 
statistical and formal models used by behaviorialists—in economics, 
political science, and empirical legal studies—the majority of legal scholars 
and practitioners use what has been termed the “legal model” to understand 
the decisions of the Supreme Court. Some legal scholars have tried to 
reconcile the legal model and the attitudinal model by engaging in a case-
by-case consideration of political and historical conditions at the time of the 
holding along with the precepts of the legal model. Jack M. Balkin & 
Sanford Levinson, Legal Historicism and Legal Academics: The Roles of 
Law Professors in the Wake of Bush v. Gore, 90 Geo. L.J. 173, 174 
(2001). This type of analysis, however, is done after the decision is rendered. 
Behavioralists’ models of decision making are able to predict the outcome of 
cases before they are decided by the Court, and political science scholars 
have argued that the legal model’s inability to predict the future 
demonstrates its deficiencies. See Segal & Spaeth, supra note 1, at 86. 
2. Linda Greenhouse, In His Opinion, N.Y. Times, Sept. 26, 1999, § 7, at 14 
(interviewing Judge Posner). 
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Tension over the legal model dates as far back as 1897; Justice 
Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. acknowledged that law is but “[t]he 
prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more 
pretentious . . . .”3 But, his belief that predicting future decisions is 
but “prophesy” would prove over time to be naïve. In their discipline, 
political scientists have firmly established that Supreme Court 
decisions can, indeed, be predicted with great accuracy.  
In this Article I will first present the two principal models—the 
attitudinal4 and strategic5 models—used by political scientists to 
predict Supreme Court decisions.6 Then I will apply these models to 
explain the outcomes of the two same-sex marriage cases at the center 
of this symposium.7 I leave the arduous task of explaining and 
reconciling the decisions through use of the legal model to 
constitutional law experts.8 Here, my task is to present the political 
science models of decision making, one applicable to United States v. 
Windsor9 and the other to Hollingsworth v. Perry.10 Without reference 
 
3. Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457, 
461 (1897). 
4. The attitudinal model states that justices’ votes are predominantly based on 
their personal policy preferences and not fidelity to the law. Segal & 
Spaeth, supra note 1, at 86. By ascertaining each of the justices’ preference, 
one can predict with great accuracy the outcome of a Supreme Court case. 
5. This model assumes justices make decisions based on their personal policy 
preferences, but acknowledges that in certain types of cases justices may 
have to settle for their second preferences in order to avoid having their 
least preferred preferences become the law of the land. Such cases usually 
involve two issues, one based on an Article III standing issue and the 
substantive issue. When justices look to the votes of their fellow justices 
and observe that no majority on the merits can be reached, they then begin 
to ascertain what their votes should be to avoid the enactment of their least 
favorite policy issue. See Lee Epstein & Jack Knight, The Choices 
Justices Make 9–21 (1998).  
6. As discussed below, there are still political scientists who adhere to the legal 
model to interpret cases, rather than to the statistically based attitudinal 
model. See infra notes 40–42 and accompanying text.  
7. Symposium, The Supreme Court’s Treatment of Same-Sex Marriage in 
United States v. Windsor & Hollingsworth v. Perry: Analysis and 
Implications, 64 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 823 (2014). 
8. Some political science scholars have argued that, whenever a majority of the 
Court fails to follow its own prior decisions, as the dissent in United States 
v. Windsor suggests of the majority, the legal model cannot explain the 
outcome of the case. See Segal & Spaeth, supra note 1. If, in fact, the 
legal model were true, then all of the justices would join a single opinion, 
applying prior case law to the current case. Id.  
9. 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (holding that DOMA’s unequal treatment of same-
sex marriage was unconstitutional under the Fifth Amendment). 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 64·Issue 3·2014 
Viewing the Supreme Court’s Marriage Cases Through 
the Lens of Political Science 
1134 
to the facts of the cases, prior precedents, or methods of 
constitutional interpretation, these models were able to predict the 
outcome of the two cases as well as a method to reconcile the judicial 
decision-making behavior in the two cases.  
In Part I, I present a historical account of the attitudinal model. 
In Part II, I apply the attitudinal model to the Windsor decision. The 
analysis demonstrates the power of the attitudinal model, which 
correctly predicted the votes of all nine Justices on the Court and 
does so simply by knowing each justice’s judicial ideology. Part III 
turns to the development of another model of decision making. This 
model, the strategic model, builds on the attitudinal model by 
acknowledging that justices are rational political actors, seeking to see 
their personal policy preferences become the law of the land. But the 
strategic model goes one step further, as it recognizes that sometimes 
justices vote with an eye towards the other justices’ preferences in 
order to form a majority opinion. To elucidate how strategic voting is 
used by the Supreme Court, I briefly discuss the strategic voting that 
occurred in the landmark case, Craig v. Boren.11 In Part IV, I look at 
the strategic voting that occurred in the Windsor dissent and the 
Perry majority opinion.  
I. Historical Development of the Attitudinal Model 
Following Holmes’s original observation,12 in the early 1920s there 
was a movement afoot among legal scholars known as legal realism; 
principally, they questioned the common wisdom13 that judges follow 
 
10. 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013) (finding the proponents of California’s constitutional 
amendment prohibiting same-sex marriage did not have standing to appeal 
the district court’s order). 
11. 429 U.S. 190 (1976). In Craig v. Boren, the Court ruled that claims that the 
government has engaged in discrimination based on gender warrants 
heightened scrutiny by the Court. However, rejecting both the strict 
scrutiny test and the traditional rational basis test, the Court used a new 
standard of review to scrutinize gender discrimination under the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments. Id. That test is now known as intermediate 
scrutiny. As discussed in Part III, this case had an initial standing issue and 
a lack of a majority on the level of scrutiny to apply to gender 
discrimination. Through strategic voting, a majority formed around the 
intermediate scrutiny test.  
12. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
13. According to British jurist Sir William Blackstone, judges are sworn “to 
determine, not according to [their] own private judgment, but according to 
the known laws and customs of the land; not delegated to pronounce a new 
law, but to maintain and expound the old one.” Walter F. Murphy & 
C. Herman Pritchett, Courts, Judges, and Politics: An 
Introduction to the Judicial Process 14 (4th ed. 1986).  
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standing legal rules (or precedents) to decide all cases.14 Instead, they 
argued that these rules are of limited use in predicting judicial 
decisions.15 Kalman called it the “idiosyncrasy” of judicial decision 
making.16 Critically, they acknowledged that decisions are made in the 
context of social reality17 and personal life experiences;18 they 
questioned the reliability of legal precedents and rules used in 
decisions to justify a jurist’s vote.19 Legal realists thus concluded that 
any given decision could be read in different ways depending on these 
two factors.20 For the legal community, the legal realists’ contribution 
towards understanding judicial decision making was both enlightening 
and disturbing: “The realists’ exposure of the judge as a human being 
who reasoned from the gut and manipulated legal rules to cover it up 
cast judicial subjectivity in a frightening light.”21  
Political Scientist C. Herman Pritchett is sometimes accredited 
with being the first behavioralist in the study of Supreme Court 
decision making.22 Rather than making unproven empirical claims, 
Pritchett would systematically study the voting behavior of the 
Roosevelt Court.23 His study was based on the theory that “justices 
are motivated by their own preferences.”24 His critical findings  
14. See generally Laura Kalman, Legal Realism at Yale: 1927–1960, 
at 3–4 (1986) (discussing the legal realism movement at Yale Law School). 
15. See id. at 5–7. 
16. Id. at 6–7. 
17. Id. at 33–34. 
18. See id. at 70. These life experiences, however, were deemed indeterminate. 
However, like today’s attitudinalists, legal realists believed that a judge’s 
ideology and the social (or political) context surrounding the decision could 
help predict outcomes. Karl N. Llewellyn, The Common Law 
Tradition: Deciding Appeals 19–61, 121–32, 178–219 (1960).  
19. Karl N. Llewellyn, Some Realism about Realism—Responding to Dean 
Pound, 44 Harv. L. Rev. 1222, 1237 (1931). 
20. See Andrew Altman, Legal Realism, Critical Legal Studies, and Dworkin, 
15 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 205, 209 (1986). 
21. Kalman, supra note 14, at 121. 
22. See C. Herman Pritchett, The Roosevelt Court: A Study in 
Judicial Politics and Values 1937–47 (1948). 
23. Id. He reached this conclusion by studying the Supreme Court decisions 
during the Roosevelt presidency and found that, in the great majority of 
cases, justices dissented from the majority or concurred only in the outcome, 
but disagreed with the majority’s legal reasoning. Id. at 32–44 (noting that 
dissents occurred in fifty-eight percent of all cases in 1943–44). He looked to 
voting patterns to establish that certain justices consistently voted in a liberal 
fashion, and some consistently voted in a conservative fashion. Id. at 33–34. 
24. Id. at xiii (arguing that the justices do not intentionally act politically but 
are, to some extent, motivated by politics). 
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demonstrated that the Roosevelt Court justices did not follow legal 
precedent or respect prior decisions through the doctrine of stare 
decisis and that there were voting blocs on the Court that could be 
categorized as “left” or “right.” Based on his findings, Pritchett 
concluded that “the Court is a political institution performing a 
political function.”25 It was his use of descriptive statistics that built 
upon the original themes of the legal realists. But Pritchett did not 
develop a model capable of predicting future decisions of Supreme 
Court justices—one that could be applied generally and not just to 
the Roosevelt Court. 
In the 1950s, political scientists began to take their role as 
“scientists” more seriously.26 This new movement, known as 
behavioralism, mimicked the dictates of the hard sciences. For 
example, political scholars began to insist that research in their field 
should posit refutable hypotheses, use quantifiable data, and rely on 
observable unbiased data to test the hypotheses. This trend also 
found traction among political science scholars of the  
Supreme Court.27  
The next major advancement in the development of the 
attitudinal model was Glendon Schubert’s research. He applied true 
scientific methods to the study of Supreme Court decision making28 
and found that Justices on the Court were political actors and their 
decisions part of the political process.29 In The Judicial Mind, 
Schubert went further. He hypothesized that a given fact pattern and 
a justice’s preferences (referred to as “ideal points”) could be scaled 
along a conservative-liberal vector.30 Later, Harold Spaeth looked to 
 
25. Id. (internal citation omitted). 
26. See Albert Somit & Joseph Tanenhaus, The Development of 
American Political Science: From Burgess to Behavioralism 
177–79 (Irvington Publishers 1982) (1967) (recording the articles of faith for 
behavioralism, which clearly indicate behavioralism should be viewed as a 
science backed by data, observations, prediction, and explanation). 
27. Cf. Jeffrey A. Segal & Harold J. Spaeth, The Supreme Court 
and the Attitudinal Model 32–64 (1993) (exploring the four precepts 
of the legal model, how they are deficient for determining judicial decisions 
and how the legal model and attitudinal model differ). 
28. Glendon A. Schubert, Quantitative Analysis of Judicial 
Behavior 77–371 (1959). 
29. Glendon A. Schubert, The Study of Judicial Decision-Making as an Aspect 
of Political Behavior, 52 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 1007 (1958) (suggesting 
different techniques to study the Court’s political behavior).  
30. Glendon A. Schubert, The Judicial Mind: The Attitudes and 
Ideologies of the Supreme Court Justices, 1946–1963, at 236–72 
(1965). 
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psychological theories of behavior, and set down the precepts of the 
attitudinal model we use today: 
ݒ݋ݐ݁ ൌ ܿܽݏ݁	ݏݐ݅݉ݑ݈݅	ሺ݂ܽܿݐݏሻ ൅ ݐ݄݁	݆ݑݏݐ݅ܿ݁′ݏ	ܽݐݐ݅ݐݑ݀݁ݏ	ሺ݅݀݁݋݈݋݃ݕሻ31 
An attitude was defined as an enduring “interrelated set of beliefs 
about an object or situation.”32 “Thus, for example, as searches by the 
police grow[] more intrusive, first liberal, then moderate, and then 
conservative judges should become increasingly likely to reject  
the search.”33  
In 1993, Spaeth and his colleague Jeffrey A. Segal would 
demonstrate empirically the strength of the attitudinal model.34 
Looking at thousands of Supreme Court decisions, each vote coded as 
“liberal” or “conservative,’” they found that seventy-one percent of a 
justice’s decision making could be explained solely by reference to the 
two facets of the attitudinal model.35 In touting the power that 
political ideology plays in a justice’s final vote, Segal and Spaeth 
presciently predicted that “if a case on the outcome of a presidential 
election should reach the Supreme Court . . . the Court’s decision 
might well turn on the personal preferences of the justices.”36 Seven 
years later, their prediction would be proven correct in Bush v. 
 
31. Harold J. Spaeth, An Introduction to Supreme Court Decision 
Making 61–69 (rev. ed. 1972). 
32. Id. at 65. 
33. Jeffrey Segal, The Attitudinal Model, Empirical Legal Studies Blog 
(July 13, 2006, 1:03 PM), http://www.elsblog.org. It must also be said that 
this explanation of the attitudinal model applies principally to cases in 
which the judge decides whether a particular fact pattern deserves a liberal 
or conservative outcome (for example, in a search and seizure case). In 
many cases, however, the facts of a case will be largely irrelevant in 
applying the attitudinal model, as the political question at stake is not 
dependent on the underlying facts. See Theodore W. Ruger et al., The 
Supreme Court Forecasting Project: Legal and Political Science Approaches 
to Predicting Supreme Court Decisionmaking, 104 Colum. L. Rev. 1150, 
1151–52 (2004). For instance, in United States v. Windsor, the facts of the 
case raise a federal tax question, but the central legal issue is whether the 
federal government must accord equal treatment to same-sex couples and 
heterosexual couples, not how the underlying tax issue should be decided. 
United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). Since the facts of the tax 
question are largely irrelevant to the same-sex marriage issue, judicial 
ideology will predominate in predicting the outcome of the case.  
34. Segal & Spaeth, supra note 27, at 73 (noting that the Supreme Court 
“may freely implement their personal policy preferences as the attitudinal 
model specifies”). 
35. Segal, supra note 33. 
36. Segal & Spaeth, supra note 27, at 70.  
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Gore.37 In this case each justice voted in line with the candidate 
closest to his or her preferred policy outcome and in so doing elected 
the President of the United States in 2000.38  
It should be noted that the attitudinal model is not without its 
critics. In fact, for political scientists who study the Court, there is a 
deep divide between those who agree with the attitudinal model39 and 
those who defend the legal model of decision making.40 Other political 
scientists simply ignore the attitudinal model and continue to engage 
in the same type of doctrinal analyses of Supreme Court cases—
application of the legal model—as do law professors and 
practitioners.41 
One of the biggest challenges to testing the attitudinal model is 
how to measure the justices’ policy preferences (or unique judicial 
ideology). Over the years, a series of proxies were used to stand for 
judicial ideology; at first, it was the justice’s political party or the 
appointing president. Eventually, Segal and Cover devised a more 
 
37. 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
38. At issue in Bush was whether the federal Equal Protection Clause 
prohibited certain counties in Florida from continuing to count votes, while 
other counties could not. Id. at 103. Here, the law cited for each side’s 
position was clearly pretext, as the liberals voted to restrict the meaning of 
equal protection and voting rights, and the conservatives to broaden the 
meaning and use of equal protection and voting rights. The citations and 
reasoning were inconsistent with the way conservative and liberal justices 
have voted in cases involving equal protection or voting rights. 
39. Segal & Spaeth, supra note 1, at 114 (“[A]ttitudinalists believe the 
structure of the American political system virtually always allows the 
justices to engage in rationally sincere behavior on the merits.”). 
40. See, e.g., Howard Gillman, What’s Law Got to Do with It? Judicial 
Behavioralists Test the “Legal Model” of Decision Making, 26 Law & Soc. 
Inquiry 465 (2001) (critiquing attitudinal research); Howard Gillman, The 
Court as an Idea, Not a Building (or a Game): Interpretive Institutionalism 
and the Analysis of Supreme Court Decision-Making, in Supreme Court 
Decision-Making: New Institutionalist Approaches 65, 65–87 
(Cornell W. Clayton & Howard Gillman eds., 1999) (discussing flaws in the 
attitude-based model); see also Ronald Kahn & Ken I. Kersch, Introduction 
to The Supreme Court and American Political Development 1, 
3–6 (Ronald Kahn & Ken I. Kersch eds., 2006) (discussing the tension 
between attitude-based and legal models). 
41. See, e.g., Ronald Kahn, Originalism, the Living Constitution and Supreme 
Court Decision Making in the Twenty-First Century: Explaining Lawrence 
v. Texas, 67 Md. L. Rev. 25, 25 (2007) (discussing the effects of the 
Court’s “Social Construction Process” on decision making); Ronald Kahn, 
Marbury v. Madison as a Model for Understanding Contemporary Judicial 
Review, in Marbury Versus Madison: Documents and 
Commentary 155, 155–60 (Mark A. Graber & Michael Perhac eds., 2002) 
(rejecting the empirical behavioralist and empirical interpretive analyses).  
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precise method to measure judicial policy preferences. Rather than 
measuring preferences dichotomously (either Democrat or Republican) 
or by a series of dummy variables (one for each of the appointing 
presidents in a given data set), Segal and Cover would place justices 
on a continuum with very conservative justices on one side and very 
liberal justices on the other.42  
They determined where the justices should be placed on a scale of 
–1 to 1 by looking at newspaper editorials written at the time of the 
justices’ nominations and before their confirmations.43 They count the 
number of liberal versus conservative newspapers endorsing 
confirmation, and based on the total number of liberal endorsements 
versus the total number of conservative ones, they assign a score to 
each justice (the “Segal-Cover Score”). For example, if there are no 
conservative newspapers endorsing confirmation of a nominee, her 
score would be –1; a person with no liberal newspaper endorsements 
would receive a score of 1. Most nominations fall somewhere in 
between on the ideological spectrum. For each new justice, a Segal-
Cover score is calculated.44  
The Segal-Cover ideology scores for the justices sitting on the 
Court at the time of the same sex marriage decisions are, from most 
conservative to most liberal, as follows: Scalia, Alito, Roberts, 
Thomas, Kennedy, Breyer, Ginsburg, Kagan, and Sotomayor.45 On 
this scale, Kennedy lies closer to the mean of the liberal justices than 
he does to the mean of the conservative justices.46 
With quantitative techniques becoming more and more advanced, 
political methodologists Andrew D. Martin and Kevin M. Quinn  
42. Jeffrey A. Segal & Albert D. Cover, Ideological Values and the Votes of 
U.S. Supreme Court Justices, 83 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 557, 561–63 (1989). 
43. Id. at 559. 
44. The Segal-Cover “ideology” scores have been calculated for all nominations 
to the Court dating back to Hugo Black’s nomination in 1937; such scores 
are ascertained only if the nominations reach the Senate floor for a 
confirmation vote, but regardless of whether or not the nominees were 
ultimately confirmed. Nominations which are withdrawn before newspapers 
render their endorsements do not receive Segal-Cover scores. The scores 
calculate not only an ideology score but a qualification score as well. It has 
been argued that ideology alone is unlikely to render a candidate 
unconfirmable provided his qualifications scores are high; if a nominee lacks 
sufficient qualifications, ideology can derail a nomination. See, e.g., Lee 
Epstein & Jeffrey A. Segal, Advice and Consent: The Politics 
of Judicial Appointments 99–102 (2005) (arguing that the Senate’s 
chief concern in confirming nominees is political). 
45. See Jeffrey A. Segal, Perceived Qualifications and Ideology 
of Supreme Court Nominees, 1937–2012, available at http://www.stony 
brook.edu/commcms/polisci/jsegal/QualTable.pdf. 
46. Id.  
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developed a new quantitative method to pinpoint judicial ideology, 
but they do so not by measuring ideology directly.47 Unlike the Segal-
Cover scores, the Martin-Quinn scores rely only on past rulings by 
each justice. Using these data, their model is run a million times on 
computers to determine the likelihood that each justice will vote in a 
bloc with each of the other justices. Because of such tightly connected 
voting blocs on the Supreme Court today, the liberal and the 
conservative blocs also serve as a measure of judicial ideology. Martin-
Quinn scores vary from year to year as more data points become 
available for evaluation of each justice. The authors consider this a 
more sophisticated method of gauging the justices’ personal ideology 
compared to past measurements.48 
The Martin-Quinn scores for the 2012 Supreme Court session 
scale the justices, from most conservative to most liberal, as follows: 
Thomas, Alito, Scalia, Roberts, Kennedy, Breyer, Kagan, Sotomayor, 
and Ginsburg.49 On this scale, Kennedy’s score lies closer to the mean 
of the conservative justices than the liberal ones. More importantly, 
Martin and colleagues have found that their model does particularly 
well “due in large part to its ability to predict more accurately the 
important votes of the moderate Justices.”50  
II. Predicting the Outcome of United States v. 
Windsor with the Attitudinal Model  
In United States v. Windsor,51 there were two legal issues for the 
Court to consider. First, whether the plaintiff had standing to bring 
 
47. See Andrew D. Martin & Kevin M. Quinn, Dynamic Ideal Point Estimation 
via Markov Chain Monte Carlo for the U.S. Supreme Court, 1953–1999, 10 
Pol. Analysis 134 (2002). But see Ward Farnsworth, The Use and Limits 
of Martin-Quinn Scores to Assess Supreme Court Justices, With Special 
Attention to the Problem of Ideological Drift, 101 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1891 
(2007) (critiquing the Martin-Quinn analysis). 
48. Martin and Quinn actually tested the accuracy of their ideology scores, and 
pitted the success of their scores against the predictions of legal experts. For 
the 2002 term, employing their statistical model, Martin and colleagues 
“predicted 75% of the Court’s affirm/reverse results correctly, while the 
experts collectively got 59.1% right.” Ruger et al., supra note 33, at 1150. 
49. See Andrew D. Martin & Kevin M. Quinn, Measures, Martin-Quinn 
Scores, http://mqscores.wustl.edu/measures.php (follow “court.xls” 
hyperlink) (last visited Feb. 10, 2014) (containing all Martin-Quinn scores 
of Justices for 2012); see also Martin & Quinn, supra note 47 (discussing 
the methodology of the Martin-Quinn scores).  
50. Ruger et al., supra note 33, at 1150.  
51. 133 S. Ct. 2675.  
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the lawsuit,52 and if so, whether the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) 
was unconstitutional under the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process 
Clause.53 As I discuss below, these circumstances raise two policy 
issues for the justices. If one’s first priority is to ensure that social 
policy is made—the federal government can or cannot treat same-sex 
marriages differently than heterosexual marriages—and, critically, he 
or she knows that there are a majority of votes to put their preferred 
substantive policy into place, then that majority would all vote yes on 
standing. Those justices who know they would lose on the merits 
would vote no on standing to delay a decision contrary to their first 
policy preference. In Windsor, with five justices wanting to strike 
down DOMA, they were eager to vote yes on the standing issue and 
proceed to the merits.54  
On the merits, were we to use the Segal-Cover or Martin-Quinn 
scores as a measurement of the justices’ ideologies and apply the 
attitudinal model, we could state with great confidence that the 
personal policy preference for the four liberals on the Court 
(Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan) would be to strike down 
DOMA. Although Kennedy, the median justice, is often difficult to 
predict,55 in this case his vote can be predicted according to the 
precepts of the attitudinal model. That is because Kennedy has “a 
strong libertarian streak.”56 In Windsor, because the key issue con-
cerned the liberty/privacy rights of citizens to marry whom they 
 
52. Id. at 2679–80. A standing question arose in Windsor during the district 
court proceedings when U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder issued a 
statement from the Obama administration that agreed with Windsor’s 
position that DOMA violated the U.S. Constitution. See Statement of the 
Attorney General on Litigation Involving the Defense of Marriage Act  
(Feb. 23, 2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/February
/11-ag-222.html (stating that the Justice Department would no longer 
defend the law in court). The Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group (BLAG) 
moved to intervene in order to continue defense of the law. Both the 
district court and appeals court held BLAG had standing to bring the 
suit. Windsor v. United States, 833 F. Supp. 2d 394, 397–99 (S.D.N.Y. 
2012), aff’d, 699 F.3d 169 (2d Cir. 2012). 
53. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2680; The Court has held that the Fifth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause also encompasses an equal protection 
provision and that such provision should be applied as it would under 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. Bolling v. 
Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499–500 (1954). 
54.    See infra Table 2.  
55. See Ruger et al., supra note 33, at 1150, 1184, 1188 (discussing the 
difficulty in assessing the way moderate justices will vote). 
56. David Boaz, Justice Kennedy’s Mysterious Philosophy, The Cato 
Institute, (June 17, 2012, 2:44 PM). www.cato.org/blog/justice-kenned
ys-mysterious-philosophy.  
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choose, we would expect that this libertarian justice’s policy 
preference would be to strike down DOMA.57 And, given this con-
figuration of votes, the conservatives—knowing they have no chance 
to garner a majority of votes on the merits—would vote no on 
standing and try to delay a ruling on same-sex marriage.58  
Kennedy’s complex set of views is actually consistent with the 
principles of Libertarians according to the Cato Institute, an 
influential think tank that promotes libertarian policies.59  
Unlike traditional conservatives, libertarians promote political 
causes that protect the right of individual privacy: “Governments 
should not use their powers to censor speech, conscript the young, 
prohibit voluntary exchanges, steal or ‘redistribute’ property, or 
interfere in the lives of individuals who are otherwise minding their 
own business.”60 In other words, government, stay out of my personal 
business. On the other hand, libertarians support many traditional 
conservative political causes.61 Kennedy supports shifting the balance 
of power away from the federal government and toward the states;62 
unlimited political donations by individuals and corporations;63 the  
57. Justice Kennedy’s past decisions also indicate this strong libertarian 
streak regarding the privacy of homosexuals. See, e.g., Texas v. Lawrence, 
539 U.S. 558, 564–67 (2003) (holding that anti-sodomy laws are a 
violation of the constitution). 
58. Even though they voted no on the standing issue, the conservatives in 
Windsor all argued in dissenting opinions that their first preferences 
were to rule on the merits and uphold DOMA. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 
2687 (Scalia, J., dissenting); id. at 2711 (Alito, J., dissenting). However, 
given the configuration of votes, this was not going to occur, making the 
denial of standing their best option. See infra Part IV.A. 
59. David Boaz, supra note 56 (stating that, while Justice Kennedy is not a 
strict Cato Institute libertarian, he has a streak of libertarian tendencies).   
60. Cato Institute, Libertarianism, http://www.cato.org/research/libertarianism 
(last visited Feb. 10, 2014).  
61. Cf. About Us, The Federalist Society, http://www.fed-
soc.org/aboutus/ (last visited Feb. 10, 2014) (stating that members of 
this influential think tank include an alliance between libertarians and 
conservatives).  
62. See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (holding that a state has 
sovereign immunity when in federal court pursuant to a federal statute); 
Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (holding that a 
state has sovereign immunity when sued in federal court pursuant to the 
U.S. Constitution); Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) 
(holding that the federal government has no authority under Fourteenth 
Amendment to abrogate a state’s sovereign immunity in age 
discrimination cases). 
63. See Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) 
(striking down McCain-Feingold law regulating campaign funding of 
federal elections). 
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elimination of race as a factor in elementary school assignments;64 and 
an individual’s right to bear arms.65 Where the libertarians and the 
traditional conservatives part company is precisely the issue at stake 
in the same-sex marriage cases: the freedom to marry a person of 
one’s choosing. Consistent with libertarian values (which seem to be 
Kennedy’s policy preferences), Kennedy has twice ruled that 
legislation borne of hatred towards homosexuals cannot survive 
heightened scrutiny.66 And, that is exactly what happened  
in Windsor.  
In sum, by using the current metrics for judicial ideology and 
knowing Kennedy’s political leanings towards libertarianism, the 
attitudinal model correctly predicted the votes of the justices in 
Windsor and was capable of doing so without any reference to the 
doctrine of stare decisis or constitutional method of interpretation, the 
tenets on which the legal model of decision making is based. While 
the justices may cite an array of decisions political behavioralists 
would dismiss these legal arguments; they argue that such citations 
are made due to institutional norms and that they also provide cover 
for the true rationale behind the justices’ votes: to see their own 
policy preferences become the law of the land.  
III. Historical Development of the Strategic Model 
The application of microeconomic theory to Supreme Court 
decision making came simultaneously with the development of the 
attitudinal model. Indeed, “rational choice” voting could be said to 
include both the attitudinal and strategic models.67 For early pioneers 
of the attitudinal model, their recognition that justices vote according 
 
64. See Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District, 551 
U.S. 701 (holding that race cannot be an even a factor in assignment of 
children to public schools).  
65. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (ruling that the 
federal government restriction on handguns violated the constitution). 
Admittedly, supporting an individual’s right to bear arms is not a 
traditional conservative political cause. See Kenneth Janda et al., The 
Challenge of Democracy: American Government in Global 
Politics 26 fig.1.2 (12th ed. 2014) (diagramming that conservatives favor 
social order over individual liberties). However, Justice’s Kennedy’s vote in 
Heller advancing an individual’s right to bear arms is included in this list 
because it is a libertarian value that aligns with a modern Republican Party 
political cause. See Republican Platform 2012, at 13, available 
at http://www.gop.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/2012GOPPlatform. 
pdf (indicating that the Republican Party “uphold[s] the right of individuals 
to keep and bear arms”). 
66. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
67. Epstein & Knight, supra note 5, at xiii. 
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to their own policy preferences is a statement of rational behavior,68 
and they began to explore how this premise of rational-choice theory 
applied to members of the Supreme Court.69  
However, as the attitudinal model dominated research for the 
next two decades,70 it was not until the 1990s that we begin to see a 
rise in scholarship grounded in rational-choice theory.71 Perhaps the 
most recognized work of this new wave of research is by Lee Epstein 
and Jack Knight. In their ground-breaking book, The Choices Justices 
Make, the authors set forth a new model of decision making known as 
the strategic model. As the authors explain: 
[J]ustices may be primarily seekers of legal policy, but they are 
not unsophisticated characters who make choices based merely 
on their own political preferences. Instead, justices are strategic 
actors who realize that their ability to achieve their goals 
depends on a consideration of the preferences of others, of the 
choices they expect others to make, and of the institutional 
context in which they act.72 
The strategic model as outlined in Epstein and Knight’s work first 
posits that justices are “primarily seekers of legal policy,” the central  
68. See Dennis Chong, Rational Lives: Norms and Values in Politics 
and Society 12 (2000) (defining rational choice as “choos[ing] the best 
available means to achieve what they understand to be in their interest”).  
69. See Schubert, supra note 29, at 1022–23 (invoking game theory to 
understand the strategic behavior of the Court’s decision making during 
the New Deal); Schubert, supra note 28, at 66 (speaking about the 
granting of certiorari petitions, Schubert observed “the Court appears 
frequently to estimate what the outcome of a case may be if it were 
taken”); see also Walter M. Murphy, Elements of Judicial 
Strategy 198–210 (1964) (using anecdotal evidence of Supreme Court 
justices’ attempts to influence other justices’ behavior); David W. 
Rhode & Harold J. Spaeth, Supreme Court Decision Making 
72–78 (1976) (integrating attitudinal and rational choice models of 
decision making). 
70. See Jeffrey A. Segal, Lee Epstein, Charles M. Cameron, & Harold J. 
Spaeth, Ideological Values and the Votes of U.S. Supreme Court 
Justices, 57 J. of Pol. 812, 812–13 (1995) (“A predominant, if not the 
predominant, view of U.S. Supreme Court decision making is the 
attitudinal model.” (emphasis in original)).  
71. See, e.g., Forrest Maltzman & Paul J. Wahlbeck, May It Please the 
Chief? Opinion Assignments in the Rehnquist Court, 40 Am. J. of Pol. 
Sci. 421, 423–25 (1996) (applying strategic model to explain opinion 
assignment); Jeffrey A. Segal, Separation of Powers Games in the 
Positive Theory of Congress and Courts, 91 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 28 
(1997) (applying strategic model to explain Congress’ constraint of 
Supreme Court voting). 
72. Epstein & Knight, supra note 5, at xiii. 
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tenet of the attitudinal model. However, this model goes one step 
further and recognizes that, under certain circumstances, justices’ will 
conclude that their own preferences are not consistent with four other 
justices, making it impossible for the justices to reach a majority vote 
on their first policy preference.73 In such cases, justices will engage in 
strategic behavior—voting based on what other justices’ votes are.74 
Finally, the strategic model assumes that the justices rank for 
themselves their preferred policy outcomes. When considering their 
final votes in a particular case, justices will vote in a manner that 
realizes their best policy option given the configuration of votes by 
the other justices.75 This often means voting to avoid your least 
favorite policy outcome. 
Certain cases are more likely to involve strategic voting than 
others; those that provide three or more policy choices for the justices 
are harder to amass a five-vote majority. Under these circumstances, 
the justices may engage in bargaining to reach a compromise position 
on the merits, one that satisfies a majority. Cases with standing issues 
also provide justices with another strategic tool, giving them the 
option of stalling a decision on the merits when they know their first 
policy preferences cannot garner a majority of votes.  
Looking briefly at Windsor, for the conservative justices, the 
majority’s votes could be predicted using the attitudinal model. 
However, the dissenters’ voting behavior could be described as 
strategic, opting for a denial of standing first over voting their sincere 
preference on the merits—to apply the traditional rational basis tests 
to claims of same-sex marriage discrimination and to rule DOMA 
constitutional.76 As the standard of review adopted in this particular 
 
73. Id. at 9–10. 
74. Id.; see also Forrest Maltzman et al., Crafting Law on the 
Supreme Court: The Collegial Game 128–48 (2000) (analyzing the 
factors of how justices’ impact one another in their voting). Later, other 
scholars would argue that the Supreme Court justices are constrained beyond 
that of what other justices’ votes are. See Virginia A. Hettinger et al., 
Comparing Attitudinal and Strategic Accounts of Dissenting Behavior on 
the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 48 Am. J. of Pol. Sci. 123 (2004).  
75. If the Court is considering a statutory case and is asked to interpret 
Congress’s intent, they must remember that Congress can overturn their 
decision if the Court strays too far on the ideological spectrum from 
Congress’s median voter. For purposes of analyzing Perry v. Hollingsworth, 
133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013), we need not consider this constraint because 
Congress cannot overturn a constitutional ruling of the Court. Here, only 
the majority rule of five votes and the votes of the other justices constrains 
each justice’s vote. See Epstein & Knight, supra note 5, at 112–81.   
76. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2696 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., 
dissenting) (stating the limits of the majority opinion to avoid answering an 
issue that lacks standing); see also id. at 2697–98 (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
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case, some type of heightened scrutiny that is not clearly defined, may 
well have been a compromise between the four liberals and one 
moderate justice, the attitudinal model still perfectly predicted their 
ultimate votes in the case.  
The first step in application of the strategic model is a 
determination of what the justices’ ranked policy preferences likely 
are. But how do we determine their post-oral argument preferences 
when these votes, and subsequent bargaining over language in the 
opinions, are highly-guarded secrets?77 In The Choices Justices Make, 
the authors took advantage of the private papers of Justices William 
J. Brennan Jr., William O. Douglas, Thurgood Marshall, and Lewis F. 
Powell, all of which were previously released to the public.78 In these 
papers, they discovered not only the recordings of initial voting at 
preliminary conferences, but also the notes written between justices to 
reach consensus on a legal policy capable of mustering a five-vote 
majority.79 The authors used Justice Brennan’s papers on the 
landmark case Craig v. Boren80 to demonstrate just how strategic 
voting works on the Court.81  
At issue in Craig was the appropriate level of scrutiny to be 
applied under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause 
 
(arguing that the Court does not have the power to hear this case, and 
even if it did, they do not hold the power to invalidate a “democratically 
adopted legislation”); id. at 2716 (Alito, J., dissenting) (stating that the 
Court has “the authority and the responsibility to interpret and apply the 
Constitution” but that the people hold the right to change that).  
77. There have been several incidents of Supreme Court clerks breaking the 
norm of confidentiality. For example, in 1998, Edward Lazarus published a 
book about the inner workings of the Court during his tenure as a clerk for 
J. Blackmun during the 1998–99 Supreme Court term. Edward P. 
Lazarus, Closed Chambers: The First Eyewitness Account of 
the Epic Struggles Inside the Supreme Court (1998). Another 
famous example came just a few years later; in 2004, anonymous clerks 
divulged to Vanity Fair Magazine what went on behind closed doors during 
the justices’ deliberations of Bush v. Gore in the 2000–01 term. David 
Margolick et al., The Path to Florida, Vanity Fair, Oct. 1, 2004, 310. 
78. Epstein & Knight, supra note 5, at xiv; see also Maltzman et al., 
supra note 74, at 57–124 (using internal memos circulated between 
justices to demonstrate strategic voting). 
79. Epstein & Knight, supra note 5, at 1–9, 100–05 (showing the change in 
votes from the preliminary conference to the final vote in Craig v. Boren, 
429 U.S. 190 (1976) and depicting policy changes in selected landmark 
Supreme Court cases from 1971 to 1985). 
80. 429 U.S. 190 (1976). 
81. Epstein & Knight, supra note 5, at 12–17 (discussing Justice Brennan’s 
policy preferences and how his ultimate course of action was to opt for his 
second preferred preference over his first). 
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to cases of gender discrimination.82 But, before the justices could 
reach this decision on the merits, they first had to decide whether the 
 
82. For almost two centuries, the idea that men and women must be treated 
equally by the government was not open to debate. In several cases at the 
turn of the twentieth century, the Court held that the genders can never be 
considered equal, affording states the opportunities to treat women as 
second-class citizens under the rational basis test. See, e.g., Bradwell v. The 
State, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 139 (1872) (statute prohibiting women’s 
admission to the Illinois Bar deemed constitutional); Radice v. New York, 
264 U.S. 292, 294 (1924) (statute prohibiting women from working at night 
was constitutional because “the two sexes differ in structure of body, in the 
functions to be performed by each, in the amount of physical strength” and 
to overwork women threatened “the future well-being of the [human] race”); 
Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 62 (1964) (statute making jury duty for 
women optional held constitutional because most women had to be home to 
care for their families).  
 As the women’s movement came into full force in the early 1970s, feminists 
turned to the courts to realize equality for women. Dorothy McBride-
Stetson, Women’s Rights in the USA: Policy Debates and 
Gender Roles 33 (3d ed. 2004). The first case to signal a change in 
approach was Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). In this case the Court ruled 
that a state statute automatically authorizing the husband, rather than the 
wife, to act as executor of a child’s estate (all things being equal) violated 
the Equal Protection Clause. While the Court uttered the words of the 
rational basis test, its application of the test was decidedly different than in 
past cases, in which legislatures were accorded the utmost deference. 
Instead, in Reed, no such deference was bestowed on the Idaho legislature. 
The Court held that the statute’s different treatment of men and women 
was unconstitutional because “[t]o give a mandatory preference to members 
of either sex over members of the other, merely to accomplish the 
elimination of hearings on the merits, is to make the very kind of arbitrary 
legislative choice forbidden by the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment . . . .” Id. Reed was the first case in history to 
strike down a statute based on sex discrimination under the Equal 
Protection Clause.  
 Since the State lost this case, many believed that the Court had, for the 
first time, engaged in a form of heightened scrutiny regarding gender 
classifications, a test above the traditional rational basis test but below the 
strict scrutiny test, which Sally Reed’s lawyers, including Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg, strongly urged in their brief. Breaking New Ground—Reed v. 
Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), The Supreme Court Historical Society, 
http://www.supremecourthistory.org/learning-center/womens-rights/bre
aking-new-ground/#breaking (last visited Mar. 24, 2014). Some called this 
new form of heightened scrutiny “rational basis with bite.” See, e.g., Kevin 
H. Lewis, Note, Equal Protection After Romer v. Evans: Implications for 
the Defense of Marriage Act and Other Laws, 49 Hastings L.J. 175, 180 
(1997) (under the rational basis plus bite standard, the Court “while 
purporting to use the rational basis test, actually applies some form of 
heightened scrutiny and invalidates the challenged law after a close 
examination of the law’s purpose and effects”). It was not until Craig v. 
Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 199 (1976), that the Court finally settled the confusion 
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plaintiffs had standing to bring the action under Article III. Set forth 
in Table 1 are the initial and final votes of the Craig Justices on both 
standing and the merits. 
 
Justice First Preferences at Conference Actual Votes 
 
Standing Standard 
Merits (if 
Standing 
Exists) 
 
Standing 
 
Standard 
 
Merits (if 
Standing 
Exists) 
 
Rehnquist No Rational Oklahoma No Rational Oklahoma 
Burger No Rational Craig No Rational Oklahoma 
Powell No Rational Craig Yes Intermediate Craig 
Blackmun No Undecided Craig Yes Intermediate Craig 
Brennan Yes Strict Craig Yes Intermediate Craig 
Stewart Yes Rational Craig Yes Unclear Craig 
White Yes Strict Craig Yes Intermediate Craig 
Marshall Yes Strict Craig Yes Intermediate Craig 
Stevens Yes Above 
Rational 
Craig Yes Intermediate Craig 
Table 1: Craig v. Boren’s Initial Votes Compared with Actual Votes83 
 
As Table 1 indicates, a majority of five immediately formed in 
favor of standing (Stewart, White, Marshall, Stevens, and Brennan). 
However, on the merits, this majority did not immediately agree on 
the standard review.84 Instead, we see a situation where three distinct 
policy choices were raised by the litigants’ and amicus curiae’s 
briefs—the traditional rational basis test, strict scrutiny, or some form 
of heighted standard of review.85 Eventually, a compromise was 
proposed that the Court use a form of heightened scrutiny higher 
 
regarding the standard of review in gender discrimination cases, adopting a 
test now known as intermediate scrutiny. 
 Though no longer applicable to gender classifications after Craig, the 
rational basis with bite test continues to be used by the Court when the 
government engages in discrimination against “politically unpopular 
groups.” See, e,g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 580 (2008) (O’Connor, 
J., concurring) (applying the test to homosexual discrimination); City of 
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 446 (1985) (indicating 
that legislation must be relationally related to a governmental purpose 
when government accused of discrimination against the mentally 
challenged); United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (applying a 
rational basis review).  
83. Epstein & Knight, supra note 5, at 8. 
84. See supra Table 1.  
85. Id.  
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than ordinary scrutiny plus bite but lower than strict scrutiny.86 The 
intermediate scrutiny test thus emerged, and a majority of six justices 
signed onto the opinion as part of the compromise.87 As expected, the 
two justices who did not want to strike down the Oklahoma 
legislation under the intermediate scrutiny test voted no on the 
standing issue. 
Concededly, it is only when one of the justices dies and his or her 
papers are released to the public that we can be certain of all of the 
facets of the strategic voting that occurred in Perry. But, the 
strategic model aids in predicting how the justices likely came to their 
final votes. I shall apply the lessons learned from Epstein and 
Knight’s account of the Craig decision to guide my theories about 
strategic voting in Perry. 
IV. Application of the Strategic Model  
to the Proposition 8 Case 
In Hollingsworth v. Perry,88 the justices were again asked to 
consider whether a government’s ban on same-sex marriage violates 
the Fourteenth Amendment; this time it was the State of California’s 
voter referendum banning same-sex marriage being considered.89 Here, 
we know that the attitudinal model alone cannot predict the votes of 
the justices since the voting blocs in the majority and dissent were 
 
86. Pursuant to the intermediate scrutiny test, when a government statute is 
challenged under the Equal Protection Clause based on the unequal 
treatment of one gender over the other, the State must prove that the 
statute serves an “important government objective” and that the means 
chosen by the legislature to further the important government interest are 
“substantially related” to that end. Craig, 429 U.S. at 199. Later, the Court 
has suggested that a third requirement must be met under intermediate 
scrutiny, that the government’s arguments in support of a statute must be 
“exceedingly persuasive.” United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 524 
(1995) (citing Miss. Univ. For Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 721 (1996)). 
Justice Scalia accused the majority in Virginia of trying to move the 
intermediate scrutiny test closer to strict scrutiny than originally intended. 
Id. at 571 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
87. The policy choice of the seventh vote in favor of Craig, Justice Stewart, is 
described as “unclear” by Epstein and Knight. Epstein & Knight, supra 
note 5, at 8. 
88. 133 S. Ct 2652 (2013). 
89. Since Windsor was a federal case, the Equal Protection Clause contained 
within the Fifth Amendment was applicable, while in Perry, a state case, 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause is at issue. The two 
clauses have been interpreted to have the same content. See supra note 53. 
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not split along ideological lines.90 Almost certainly, the strategic model 
explains the votes in this case.  
The substantive issue in Perry was whether California could ban 
same-sex marriage under the Equal Protection Clause, rather than, as 
in Windsor, whether the federal government could institute such ban. 
To rule in favor of the same-sex couples in Perry, as a practical 
matter, would be tantamount to overturning the same-sex marriage 
bans of thirty-three sovereign states—separate from the United 
States, the single sovereign at issue in Windsor.91 But, before reaching 
this very broad and controversial decision on the merits, the Court 
was required to consider whether the designated representative of the 
State of California, Hollingsworth, had Article III standing to bring 
this case.92 Though the circumstances of the standing issue in Perry 
 
90. Sotomayor, considered among the most liberal according to Martin-Quinn 
and Segal-Cover scores, was joined in dissent by Kennedy—the median 
voter—and two of the most conservative justices on the Court, Alito and 
Thomas. See Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2668 (2013) (Kennedy, J., 
dissenting). Clearly, these Justices wanted to decide the central issue on gay 
marriage now, without regard to what the outcome of that vote might be. 
In the majority, we also see an unusual voting bloc, two conservatives, 
Scalia and Roberts, joined by three liberals, Breyer, Ginsburg, and Kagan; 
these justices agreed that the central issue in Perry should not be decided 
now but put off for another day. Id. (majority opinion). 
91. “[T]he Court must be cautious before entering a realm of controversy where 
the legal community and society at large are still formulating ideas and 
approaches to a most difficult subject.” Id. at 2674 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
92. After arguing before the California lower courts that Proposition 8 should 
be respected, the then–Attorney General of California, Jerry Brown (D), did 
an about-face and argued before the California Supreme Court that the 
voter referendum was unconstitutional. Justin Evers, California Attorney 
General Jerry Brown Asks Court to Overturn Prop 8, U.S. News & 
World Report (Dec. 22, 2008), http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2
008/12/22/california-attorney-general-jerry-brown-asks-court-to-overturn-pr
op-8. Then, as the case moved to the federal courts, the State of California 
defended Prop 8 before Judge Vaughn Walker. See generally Perry v. 
Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal 2010). After the decision, 
Governor Schwarzenegger and Governor-elect Jerry Brown declined to 
pursue an appeal. The leader of a group that had proposed and campaigned 
for Proposition 8, Hollingsworth, was allowed by the State to carry on the 
case. Though the Ninth Circuit held Hollingsworth had standing, the 
Supreme Court overruled this decision. The Court held that “[n]o matter 
how deeply committed petitioners may be to upholding Proposition 8 or 
how ‘zealous [their] advocacy,’ that is not a ‘particularized’ interest 
sufficient to create a case or controversy under Article III.” Hollingsworth v. 
Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2663 (2013) (citation omitted) (citing Lujan v. 
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)). 
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bear stark resemblance to those in Windsor, the Perry Court reached 
the opposite conclusion.93  
Lacking any of the justices’ personal notes about the voting in 
Perry, I turn to other sources to glean first preferences. The logical 
place to turn to gauge initial preferences is the final decision in 
Windsor, each case presenting similar standing and equal protection 
issues over recognition of same-sex marriage. Set forth in Table 2 are 
the final votes in Windsor and Perry. Comparing the votes in the two 
same-sex marriage cases, two puzzling issues are raised. First, why did 
three of the five justices (Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan) who voted in 
favor of standing in Windsor decline to do so in Perry? These justices, 
together with Sotomayor and Kennedy, had already approved the 
application of heightened scrutiny in striking down the federal DOMA 
because the raison d’etre of the statute was to discriminate against a 
class of people the legislature did not like.94 Arguably, the same could 
be said of the California voter referendum. Why did they want to 
delay a decision here? 
 
 
Justice 
Windsor Votes/Likely First Preferences in 
Hollingsworth 
Actual Votes in 
Hollingsworth 
Standing Standard of 
Review 
Position on 
Same-Sex 
Marriage 
Standing/Delay 
Roberts No Rational No No/Delay 
Scalia No Rational No No/Delay 
Thomas No Rational No Yes 
Alito No Rational No Yes 
Kennedy Yes Heightened? 95 Yes Yes 
Ginsburg Yes Heightened? Yes No/Delay 
Breyer Yes Heightened? Yes No/Delay 
Sotomayor Yes Heightened? Yes Yes 
Kagan Yes Heightened? Yes No/Delay 
Table 2: Comparison of Votes in U.S. v. Windsor and 
Hollingsworth v. Perry 
 
  
93. Like Windsor, both standing issues involved a determination whether the 
party opposing same-sex marriage could pursue the case after the respective 
governing bodies refused to defend bans on same-sex marriage.  
94. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2696 (2013). 
95. I place question marks for the standard of review pronounced in Windsor 
because it is not clear whether this test is the same one used in cases like 
Reed v. Reed or is some other form of heightened scrutiny. 
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The second puzzling issue is why two conservatives (Thomas and 
Alito) voted in favor of standing in Perry but took the opposite view 
in Windsor? Surely these justices understood, in light of Windsor, 
that it was highly unlikely they could pick up three more votes to see 
their first policy preference as expressed in Windsor—use of the 
traditional rational basis test to analyze homosexual discrimination 
under the Equal Protection Clause—realized. 
Instead of the votes in Windsor, I relied on statements made by 
Justice Ginsburg before the Perry decision was handed down, in 
conjunction with scholarship about the timing of Roe v. Wade.96 This 
evidence provides me with insight as to the strategic voting that may 
account for the three liberal justices’ switch in positions on standing 
from the Windsor to Perry cases. In addition, political science 
literature can explain why Justices Thomas and Alito voted to 
proceed to a decision on the merits despite their inability to prevail. 
Alternatively, relying on the strategic voting patterns in Craig, I posit 
two more theories that suggest that the five-member majority in 
Windsor may not have been able to reach a compromise over the 
correct standard of review on the merits in Perry and whether the 
Due Process Clause also provides an avenue to analyze the case.  
A. Delay the Decision on the Merits 
The most likely explanation for the switch in position by Justices 
Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan was foreshadowed by Justice Ginsburg 
beginning a year preceding the Perry decision. In a speech at 
Columbia University Law School in early 2012, Ginsburg explained 
that judicial restraint can sometimes be a more effective policy choice 
for the justices than making an expansive, aggressive decision like 
Roe: “It’s not that the judgment was wrong, but it moved too far too 
fast.”97 More than a year later, in a public conversation about Roe v. 
Wade at the University of Chicago Law School, Justice Ginsburg 
reiterated her uneasiness about the Court’s timing of the Roe 
decision: “It should have held only that the Texas law before it in 
Roe, which prohibited abortion unless necessary to save the life of the 
woman, was unconstitutional, leaving for the future the question of 
what other restrictions on abortion might be constitutional.”98 Later, 
she spoke of the backlash the decision unleashed “the Court had given  
96. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
97. David Crary, Ruth Bader Ginsburg Questions Timing of Roe v. Wade, 
Gives Hint on Same Sex Marriage Issue, Huffington Post (Feb. 10, 
2012, 6:16 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/02/10/ruth-bader-
ginsburg-roe-v-wade-gay-marriage_n_1269399.html. 
98. Geoffrey R. Stone, Justice Ginsburg, Roe v. Wade and Same-Sex Marriage, 
Huffington Post (May 12, 2013, 11:42 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost
.com/geoffrey-r-stone/justice-ginsburg-roe-v-wa_b_3264307.html. 
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opponents of access to abortion a target to aim at 
relentlessly . . . . My criticism of Roe is that it seemed to have 
stopped the momentum that was on the side of change.”99 Instead, she 
advocated that the Court “put its stamp of approval on the side of 
change and let that change develop in the political process.”100  
Clearly her remarks suggest that she was worried that a bold, 
sweeping decision on same-sex marriage at this time would lead to 
enormous political backlash from conservatives, particularly since the 
Court would be cutting off political debate on a highly divisive social 
issue. There is a large body of scholarship which supports her call for 
judicial restraint under the political conditions present in Perry.101  
Specifically regarding Roe, scholars, such as Gerald N. Rosenberg, 
argue that the Court’s decision to step into the abortion debate, just 
as the pro-choice movement was starting to gain political momentum, 
but before the issue had fully percolated with the American public 
and state legislatures, was an ill-advised path to take.102 He and others 
maintain that the Court’s premature action over a sweeping and 
controversial social issue led to the birth of the then-nascent pro-life 
countermovement.103 The influence of the pro-life movement created 
by Roe cannot be overstated.  
 
99. Jason Keyser, Ruth Bader Ginsburg: Roe v. Wade Ruling Flawed, 
Huffington Post (May 11, 2013, 10:40 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost. 
com/2013/05/11/ruth-bader-ginsburg-roe-v-wade_n_3261187.html. 
100. Id. 
101. See, e.g., Michael J. Klarman, From Jim Crow to Civil Rights: 
The Supreme Court and the Struggle for Racial Equality 464 
(2004) (noting that the Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) 
decision prompted backlash from Southern States over civil rights); Gerald 
N. Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About 
Social Change 182 (1991) (discussing that Roe led to a pro-life counter-
movement); Michael J. Klarman, Brown and Lawrence (and Goodridge), 104 
Mich. L. Rev. 431, 459–73 (2005) [Klarman, Brown and Lawrence] 
(discussing the backlash against homosexual rights and same-sex marriage 
after the Lawrence and Goodridge decisions); Neal Devins, I Love You, Big 
Brother, 87 Calif. L. Rev. 1283, 1297 (1999) (discussing the post-Roe 
backlash); William N. Eskridge Jr., Pluralism and Distrust: How Courts Can 
Support Democracy by Lowering the Stakes of Politics, 114 Yale L.J. 1279, 
1312–13 (2005) (opining that the Roe Court should not have intervened in the 
political process over abortion rights); Cass R. Sunstein, One Case at a 
Time: Judicial Minimalism on the Supreme Court 54 (1999) 
(advocating that the Court engage in “minimalism,” or judicial restraint, to 
allow the political process to decide certain sweeping social issues). 
102. Rosenberg, supra note 101, at 182–89.  
103. Id. at 188; Eskridge, supra note 101, at 1326; Cass R. Sunstein, Three Civil 
Rights Fallacies, 79 Calif. L. Rev. 751, 766 (1991). But see Linda 
Greenhouse & Reva B. Siegel, Before Roe v. Wade: Voices That 
Shaped the Abortion Debate Before the Supreme Court’s  
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For instance, the movement became very influential within the 
Republican Party. Beginning in 1980 and continuing through the 2012 
presidential election, every Republican Party platform has promised 
to appoint judges who believe in “traditional family values” and the 
“sanctity of human life.”104 Carrying out that promise, Republican 
presidents Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush appointed five 
justices to the Court in the period of 1981–1992, all of whom were 
believed to support the party’s position on “the sanctity of human 
life.” But, the right to life proponents ultimately failed in their 
mission to overturn Roe because, in Planned Parenthood v. Casey,105 
three of these five Republican appointees (O’Connor, Kennedy, and 
Souter) agreed with Roe that women have a constitutional right to 
terminate a pregnancy before viability.106  
The movement’s efforts did not end there. Besides influencing the 
appointment of Supreme Court justices, the pro-life interest groups 
have lobbied state legislatures to enact restrictions on a woman’s 
right to choose, many of which were upheld in Casey, including 
twenty-four-hour waiting periods, informed consent, parental consent 
for minors, and onerous reporting requirements for doctors providing 
abortions. Since Casey, states have enacted other harsh measures 
designed to impede the availability of abortions.107  
 
Ruling ix (2012), available at http://documents.law.yale.edu/sites/default/
files/BeforeRoe2ndEd_1.pdf (discussing that the backlash against abortion 
rights began prior to Roe and was led by the Catholic Church); William N. 
Eskridge Jr., Channeling: Identity-Based Social Movements and Public Law, 
150 U. Pa. L. Rev. 419, 520 (2001) (“The pro-life countermovement was 
already well under way by the time Roe was handed down.”).  
104. See, e.g., Republican Platform 1980, available at www.Presidency.ucsb. 
edu/ws/?pid=25844 (“We will work for the appointment of judges at all 
levels of the federal judiciary who respect traditional family values and 
the sanctity of human life.”); Republican Platform 1984, available at 
www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=25845 (“[W]e reaffirm our support 
for the appointment of judges at all levels of the judiciary who respect 
traditional family values and the sanctity of innocent human life.”); 
Republican Platform 1988, available at www.Presidency.ucsb.edu/w
s/?pid=25846 (same); Republican Platform 1992, available at www.P
residency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=25847 (same); Republican Platform 1996, 
available at www.Presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=25848 (same); Republican 
Platform 2000, available at www.Presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=25849 
(same); Republican Platform 2004, available at www.Presidency. 
ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=25850 (same); Republican Platform 2008, available 
at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=78545 (same.); Republican 
Platform 2012, supra note 65 (same). 
105. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
106. Id.  
107. Twenty states now require that abortions be performed in hospitals after a 
certain point; nineteen states prevent partial-birth abortions; twenty-seven 
 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 64·Issue 3·2014 
Viewing the Supreme Court’s Marriage Cases Through 
the Lens of Political Science 
1155 
Many of the political factors present in Roe were also present 
when a series of state supreme courts lifted bans on same-sex 
marriage, beginning with a Hawaii Supreme Court ruling in 1993 
making same-sex marriage legal,108 prompting many scholars to 
lament the onset of a backlash.109 Now, twenty years after the Hawaii 
decision, the political landscape concerning same-sex marriage has 
considerably changed, but is still deemed not appropriate for Supreme 
Court intervention by at least three justices. At the time of the Perry 
 
states allow individual health care providers to refuse to fund abortion 
procedures regardless of religious reasons; seventeen states require a woman 
receive counseling before an abortion—this counseling may require telling 
women that there is a purported link between abortion and breast cancer (in 
five states), the fetus can feel pain (in twelve states), or long term mental 
health consequences will befall a woman who has an abortion (in eight states). 
Guttmacher Institute, State Policies in Brief: An Overview of 
Abortion Laws (Feb. 1, 2014), available at www. Guttmacher.org 
/statecenter/spibs/spib_OAL.pdf. One state, Virginia, required women to 
undergo transabdominal ultrasounds prior to receiving an abortion. Va.  
Code Ann. § 18.2-76 (West Supp. 2013); see also Lucy Madison, Virginia 
Gov. Bob McDonnell Signs Virginia Ultrasound Bill, CBS News (Mar. 7, 
2012, 5:47 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/Virginia-gov-bob-mcdonnell-
signs-virginia-ultrasound-bill/. And, now, nine states have legislation pending 
which would make abortions illegal after twenty weeks of pregnancy (Arkansas 
passed such legislation), which is before viability, or have defined “personhood” 
as beginning at conception, making abortions a form of homicide. State Policy 
Trends 2013: Abortion Bans Move to the Fore, Guttmacher Institute 
(Apr. 11, 2013), www.guttmacher.org/media/inthenews/2013/04/11.  
108. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993). 
109. See Gerald N. Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring 
About Social Change? 339–419 (2d ed. 2008) (extending the thesis of the 
book’s earlier edition to the marriage equality decisions in Hawaii (1993), 
Vermont (1999), and Massachusetts (2003)); Gerald N. Rosenberg, Courting 
Disaster: Looking for Change in All the Wrong Places, 54 Drake L. Rev. 
795, 813 (2006) (arguing that marriage equality would have advanced more 
quickly if the social-movement lawyers had never brought their cases or had 
lost all of them); John D’Emilio, The Marriage Fight Is Setting Us Back, 
Gay & Lesbian Rev. Worldwide, Nov.–Dec. 2006, 10 (lamenting the 
LGBT rights movement’s over-reliance on courts); Klarman, Brown and 
Lawrence, supra note 101 at 459–73 (applying Rosenberg’s backlash thesis to 
the Massachusetts marriage decision); Jane S. Schacter, Courts and the 
Politics of Backlash: Marriage Equality Litigation, Then and Now, 82 S. Cal. 
L. Rev. 1153, 1217–23 (2009) (applying Rosenberg’s backlash thesis to the 
California marriage decision and contrasting it with California’s 1948 decision 
requiring recognition of interracial marriages, which produced much less 
backlash). But see William N. Eskridge Jr., Backlash Politics: How 
Constitutional Litigation Has Advanced Marriage Equality in the United 
States, 93 B.U. L. Rev. 275, 279 (2013) (arguing that Rosenberg’s theory of 
constitutional backlash is not applicable to same sex-marriage cases). 
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decision, only seventeen states allowed same-sex marriages, but public 
opinion on same-sex marriage was on the rise.110  
Given her public remarks about Roe, we can glean Ginsburg’s 
thinking about Perry. Clearly she fears the possibility of the Roe 
history repeating itself. While she had expressed her approval of 
same-sex marriage in Windsor, Perry was another story as it would 
have affected all thirty-three state laws banning same-sex marriage. 
Instead, she wanted to take a wait-and-see approach.  
Ginsburg, fearing the possibility of anti-gay forces becoming an 
influential political powerhouse as happened in Roe, clearly favored a 
wait-and-see approach. She seems to have influenced the voting of the 
other two liberal justices who voted to delay a ruling on the broader 
issue of same-sex marriage presented in Perry compared to Windsor. 
Thus, even though these three justices favor the legalization of same-
sex marriage as stated in Windsor (their first preference), by ruling 
that Hollingsworth did not have standing (their second preference), 
they were able to avoid the possibility of a fervent anti-gay backlash. 
At the same time, they also avoided a ruling that the U.S. 
Constitution does not guarantee citizens the right to same-sex 
marriage (their last choice). By exercising judicial restraint and 
letting the political process continue to grapple with this issue, the 
Ginsburg Three hoped that the gay rights movement would have time 
to develop, eventually reaching the hearts and minds of a greater 
percentage of the American public and, in turn, the hearts and minds 
of state legislators. It is only when a more sizable number of states 
have adopted pro-same-sex marriage legislation or state constitutional 
amendments that the Court should rule on the matter and jump into 
the political debate. But, with recent developments providing federal 
circuit courts the opportunity to rule on this issue—causing a split in 
the circuits over the interpretation of the federal Equal Protection 
Clause—the Court may be forced to render a decision on the merits 
sooner than Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan would like.111  
 
110. See Robin Fretwell Wilson, Marriage of Necessity: Same-Sex Marriage and 
Religious Liberty Protections, 64 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1161, 1206–07 
(2014) (discussing the shift in public opinion toward acceptance of same-sex 
marriage). As of July 2013, fifty-two percent of Americans favor making 
same-sex marriage legal. Lydia Saad, In U.S., 52% Back Law to Legalize 
Gay Marriage in 50 States, Gallup Politics (July 29, 2013), www.gallup
.com/poll/163730/back-law-legalize-gay-marriage-states.aspx. But, for 
those between eighteen and thirty-four years old, that number was sixty-
nine percent while the number for those fifty-five and older was thirty-eight 
percent. Id. Through generational change, it is said that by 2020, gay 
marriage will be legal in forty-four states. Nate Silver, Assessing the Shift in 
Public Opinion, N.Y. Times, Mar. 27, 2013, at A15. 
111. There is now a split in the Circuits on whether the denial of same-sex 
marriage violates the Equal Protection Clause or the Due Process Clause’s 
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What about Alito and Thomas, who both voted in Windsor that 
standing did not exist? Why the change of heart in Perry when they 
certainly knew that they would not amass a majority of votes to carry 
out their first preferences as revealed in Windsor? Though they could 
have voted again to delay the issue, as did Justices Roberts and 
Scalia, they likely accepted the fact that the same-sex marriage issue 
is a ship that has sailed. Accordingly, they simply voted in accordance 
with their true preferences—to proceed to a decision on the merits 
and adopt the traditional rational basis test as the standard of 
review—regardless of the likelihood they would prevail.  
Alito’s and Thomas’s behavior, as the two most conservative 
justices,112 mimics that of current members of a right-wing faction in 
Congress often referred to as the Tea Party. Recently, in the debate 
over the 2014 federal budget, Tea Party affiliates refused to pass a 
budget unless implementation of the American Health Act were to be 
delayed a year. Clearly, they knew that such provision would never be 
approved by the Democrat-controlled Senate, nor signed into law by 
President Obama. But, characteristic of the political behavior of 
purist politicians—characterized by a commitment to ideological 
purity—they voted their true preferences rather than engage in 
strategic behavior.113 Eventually, the professional politicians in the 
 
right to privacy. Compare Baskin v. Bogan, __ F.3d __ (7th Cir. 2014) 
(determining on equal protection grounds) with Kitchen v. Herbert, Docket 
No. 13-4178 (10th Cir. 2014) (determining on due process and equal 
protection grounds). In addition, a third circuit has ruled same sex marriage 
bans are unconstitutional, citing Windsor. Bostic v. Schaefer, Docket No. 
14-1167 (4th Cir. 2014); Bishop v. Smith, __ F.3d __, Docket No. 14-5006 
(10th Cir. 2014). A fourth circuit court decision from the Sixth Circuit is 
pending. Citing Windsor as precedent on a similar issue, the Ninth Circuit 
has ruled that under heightened scrutiny, jurors cannot be struck by 
preemptory challenges on the basis of sexual preference. SmithKline 
Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Labs., No. 11-17357 (9th Cir. Jan. 20, 2014). Of 
course, behavioralists would see the Windsor citation as cover so that the 
judges could see their own policy preferences realized. 
112. Martin & Quinn, supra note 47, at 147. It is no coincidence that these 
justices wanted to vote on the merits. As is true in party politics, the most 
fervent ideologues tend to avoid compromise at all costs.  
113. James Q. Wilson, The Amateur Democrat: Club Politics in 
Three Cities 1–2 (1962); see also Aaron Wildavsky, The Goldwater 
Phenomenon: Purists, Politicians, and the Two-Party System, 27 The 
Rev. of Pol. 386, 393–96 (1965) (ideologues coming into the party system 
characterized as “purists”); Nelson W. Polsby & Aaron Wildavsky, 
Presidential Elections: Strategies of American Electoral 
Politics 30–31 (4th ed. 1976) (“[P]urists consider the stock-in-trade of the 
politician—compromise and bargaining, conciliating the opposition, bending 
a little to capture public support—to be hypocritical; they prefer a style 
that relies on the announcement of principles and on moral crusades.”). 
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Republican Party decided to join Democrats in both houses of 
Congress, and Republicans in the Senate, to pass a budget 
representing a compromise. Those affiliated with the Tea Party voted 
no to such a budget.  
Kennedy and Sotomayor, who also voted to strike down DOMA 
in Windsor, did not agree with the strategic voting choices made by 
Justices Breyer, Kagan and Ginsburg. Kennedy and Sotomayor were 
ready to hand down a sweeping decision that would strike down state 
bans of same-sex marriage, a ruling consistent with their preferences 
as indicated in Windsor.  
As for the two conservative justices (Roberts and Scalia) who 
voted that Hollingsworth had no standing, they engaged in the same 
type of strategic voting they evidenced in Windsor. We know from 
Windsor that their first preferences were to vote on the merits and 
rule against same sex marriage. But, lacking the votes to gain a 
majority for their first preferred option, they joined forces with the 
Ginsburg Three and opted for a delay over the possibility that their 
least favored preference, similar to the Windsor holding, would prevail 
if the Court were forced to address the substantive issue on the 
merits. Perhaps these two justices hoped that, by delaying the vote, a 
different configuration of justices may appear in the future, with a 
new majority forming in support of their favored substantive position.  
B. The Standard of Review Pursuant to the Equal Protection Clause 
A second explanation of the unusual voting patterns in Perry is 
that the five justices who presumably favor same-sex marriage based 
on their votes in Windsor (Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, 
and Kagan) may have been split as to the constitutional level of 
scrutiny to be applied in homosexual discrimination cases, just as the 
justices were split over the standard of review for gender discrimina-
tion as in Craig. Since Perry involves an issue arguably equal to 
gender discrimination, there were three possible levels of scrutiny at 
play: intermediate scrutiny, ordinary scrutiny with bite (also 
heightened scrutiny), or the traditional rational basis test.114 I could 
imagine a scenario in which Justice Kennedy wanted to keep using his 
vaguely worded heightened-scrutiny standard of review for cases 
involving homosexuals’ liberty rights115 and the four liberal justices 
wanted the intermediate scrutiny test. Thus, as in Craig, no one test 
could garner a majority. Since no one position on the merits garnered  
114. Justice Kennedy seemingly used this standard not only in United States v. 
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013), but also in prior cases involving state-
sanctioned homosexual discrimination. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 
620 (1996); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
115. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 620; Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 558; Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 
at 2675.  
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a majority, three liberal justices decided to delay a vote on the merits. 
And, for the same reasons stated above, two more conservative 
justices joined their decision to delay a vote on the merits. 
Along the same lines, one could imagine another configuration of 
votes regarding the correct level of scrutiny for homosexual 
discrimination cases; perhaps the three women on the Court wanted 
to adopt the intermediate scrutiny test to homosexual discrimination 
cases, just as other types of gender discrimination are accorded. Since 
women have suffered similar de jure discrimination, they are better 
positioned than heterosexual men to understand the plight of 
homosexuals.116 Moreover this is the test that Justice Ginsburg, as the 
lead litigator for the ACLU’s Women’s Rights Project in the 1970s, 
successfully advocated before the Supreme Court in Craig.117  
C. The Right to Marry Should Be Analyzed Under  
the Due Process Clause 
There is yet a third possibility for the strategic voting in Perry. 
Perhaps there was a split in votes among the five justices who formed 
a majority in Windsor, which struck down DOMA, as to the 
appropriate framework for analyzing state legislation that interferes 
with homosexuals’ right to marry. Do they rely on the Equal 
Protection Clause or the Due Process Clause? Certainly, Kennedy 
seems attached to an equal protection analysis.118 But the other four 
justices in the Windsor majority may want to consider the same-sex 
marriage issue under the Due Process Clause, which was the approach 
in Roe. Under such analysis, it is irrefutable that marriage has long 
been deemed a fundamental right.119 Since marriage is a fundamental 
right, the State would be required to defend its restrictions on same-
sex marriage according to the strict scrutiny test.120 Thus, the State  
116. Christina L. Boyd, Lee Epstein, & Andrew D. Martin, Untangling the 
Causal Effects of Sex on Judging, 54 Am. J. of Pol. Sci. 389, 401–02 
(2010) (finding female judges are more likely to vote for a female plaintiff in 
a gender discrimination case than are men).  
117. Justice for Beer Drinkers—Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976), Supreme 
Court Historical Society, http://www.supremecourthistory.org/learnin
g-center/womens-rights/justice-for-beer-drinkers/ (last visited Mar. 25, 2014). 
118. He used the same reasoning in Romer, 517 U.S. at 623, in which the Court 
struck down a Colorado statute which forbid progressive cities from 
according homosexuals equal rights, and in Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2675.  
119. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (acknowledging 
marriage is a fundamental right); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) 
(acknowledging marriage as a fundamental right). 
120. The strict scrutiny test requires that the State prove it had a compelling 
state interest when passing legislation that interferes with a fundamental 
right and that the means chosen to accomplish the ends are narrowly 
tailored.  
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would need to prove it had a compelling state interest in seeing that 
“marriage” is defined as one between man and woman and that the 
statue is “narrowly tailored” to accomplish its compelling interest. 
Under this test, the State almost always loses.121  
In all likelihood, these different standards of analysis under the 
Equal Protection Clause and the Due Process Clause as applied to 
same-sex marriage cases will be hotly debated among the justices 
when the Court finally decides the issue on the merits. Will five 
justices, all of whom favor same-sex marriage, reach a compromise on 
the correct standard of review in order to form a majority? Or will 
they vote their first preferences in which case no one position is likely 
to muster five votes. In such case, the constitutional issue regarding 
same-sex marriage will remain unsettled, just as the correct standard 
of review in gender discrimination cases was unsettled in the  
early 1970s.  
 
 
121. One notable exception was Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003), in 
which the Court found that a state’s right to diversify the student body at 
an institution of higher learning was a compelling state interest. The 
University of Michigan’s policy, considering race as a factor in the 
admissions process, was banned pursuant to a voter referendum, which was 
held to be constitutional by the Court. Schuette v. Coalition to Defend 
Affirmative Action, __ U.S. __ Docket No. 12–682 (2014).  
